

Cr Nicole Johnston

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The Hon Paul de Jersey AC, CVO, QC
Governor of Queensland (retired)
Chief Justice Supreme Court (retired)
C/-Brisbane City Council Flood Review

Dear Mr de Jersey

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to the 2022 Brisbane Flood Review. I very much appreciated the opportunity to speak with you in person on Wednesday, 30 March on behalf of my community.

Many of the issues I raised with you at that meeting are canvassed below plus additional matters.

My comments are related to the Brisbane City Council (Council) flood response but I acknowledge and understand that Council relied upon and worked with numerous other agencies during the recent natural disaster. The State Government's failures are as significant. The Federal Government has all but abandoned the community.

By way of background 9 of 10 Tennyson Ward suburbs flooded and approx. 134 streets or roughly about a third of the ward, map attached (Att 1). Approximately 3000 houses and businesses have been flood impacted in some way, many catastrophically. So many people have been devastated again.

I have now been part of two major floods in Brisbane as the local Councillor. 2011 was a more significant event with around 5000 houses and businesses flooded in my ward and the flood height approx 1m higher. Many residents of my ward have been flooded three or even more times. In 2011 it was chaos because people did not really know what they were doing. This time around Brisbane City Council's disaster response has actively hindered flood response and recovery.

In my view Council has failed to implement many of the recommendations of the 2011 Brisbane Flood Review but is publicly claiming that they have. The January 2011 Flood Action plan is stamped "complete" but many recommendations have only been partially implemented or not at all. The 2011 Flood was treated as one and done by Council at the political and administrative level. It's something I have been raising at Council for the past 11 years as the impact of the 2011 floods was enormous and distressing for me and the community I represent. Council has failed to work cooperatively with local councillors such as myself to deliver the necessary and recommended flood mitigation infrastructure, warning systems, evacuation protocols, training and community preparedness.

Some recommendations have been implemented well. For example, the comprehensive updates to Brisbane's flood mapping scheme. There is excellent data available about flood levels on individual properties and flood mapping. Including a flood wise report in any contract of sale and tenancy agreement should be a mandatory condition of any contract in much the

same way as a pest inspection or structural report. This would be unpopular and would require State Government legislative change but people purchasing or renting houses in flood prone areas must know their flood risk so they can be prepared.

I cannot remember the last time it was included on a rates notice as recommended by the 2011 Flood Report.

In a crisis everyone needs to work together. Local knowledge is critical to an effective disaster response and recovery. Council's failure to work with local councillors such as myself over the past 11 years, despite repeated requests, is actively hindering the flood response.

Again, as it did in 2011, the organic community response was immediate and significantly preceded government action.

In Tennyson Ward, groups I worked with in 2011 immediately put their hands up to help including the Yeronga Community Centre, Tzu Chi Foundation, Graceville State School and later the Sherwood Neighbourhood Centre. The Yeronga Community Centre had an official role in the flood response as a recognised flood hub and Tzu Chi took on both an official role in the central disaster plan but an even more critical role locally. They are model organisations for community and government disaster response and recovery and I encourage all levels of government to learn from their work both as volunteer groups in 2011 and as recognised organisations in 2022.

Many new organisations emerged offering critical help including the Graceville Presbyterian Church, Oxley Uniting Church and Riverlife Baptist Church, as well as Facebook's community pages which significantly aided the organic community response by providing a superhighway for sourcing and responding to calls for local help. Schools, local businesses, neighbours, family and friends all banded together in the best our local community has to offer.

In my ward, I have positive working relationships with both State (Miller and Mt Ommaney) and Federal (Moreton) members which significantly assisted in mobilising the community and government response. My staff were incredible, despite all being flood impacted and despite difficult working conditions without an office. Thanks and recognition must go to them all for the critical and extraordinary role they played in the 2022 Flood.

All of this happened without the involvement of Brisbane City Council and, in some cases, despite the misguided intervention of Council; for example, with Graceville State School.

In 2011 I learnt first-hand that floods are dynamic. Government is not. A highly centralised top down approach by Council can never be dynamic. It is disappointing to say so, and I know my own actions were not perfect by any means, but my own observations and experience, interactions with Council and feedback from local residents underscores my view that that Council's actions have actively hindered the immediate flood response and community recovery.

I want to be clear that the efforts of individual council officers during the floods have been incredible. They worked their guts out for the community. My feedback is directed towards the management, organisation and leadership of the flood response by Council and the LDCC. It needs drastic improvement, because another flood or another super-cell storm will be coming and Council can do better.

Better recognising the role Councillors play in their wards as a critical link between the organisational wing of Council and their community would be valuable.

Further specific feedback in response to the terms of reference is noted below together with recommendations and supporting materials.

Warnings and Evacuations

There was a complete failure by all levels of government to undertake a timely and effective warning and evacuation response to the 2022 Flood. Failure to recognise the flood while it was happening and then too late adversely impacted on Council's response. It is clear that all agencies were not ready or prepared, but did what they could and in some cases risked their lives to help others. In particular, the role of the Local SES, Sherwood and Annerley Police, police recruits and Rocklea Fire and Emergency services was critical in Tennyson Ward.

The Bureau of Meteorology's (BOM) role in the failure of the warning/alert system will be carefully assessed I am sure. However, the Council Local Disaster and Coordination Centre's (LDCC) failure to understand or recognise the real time advice being provided about localised flooding was problematic and disappointing.

On Saturday 26 and Sunday 27 February I was advising the LDCC that homes were flooding from as early at 10.58am. 21 notifications of flooded homes were provided (Att 2). On Saturday night and Sunday I started asking for the police to be called as residents were trapped in Oxley and Fairfield and on Sunday in Corinda.

My job in Council's disaster team is to feed info into the LDCC to facilitate the official disaster response. I was doing this flat out over the weekend of the flood event, and have continued every day since. It seems that this advice was either ignored or disregarded as the Lord Mayor (and Premier) continued to tell people that flooding was minor, to stay home or to sandbag. All the time people's homes were flooding, they were being cut off from escape or isolated because of the failure to warn people to evacuate and the appalling mixed messaging. It is a miracle no lives were lost.

Telling people to "stay at home" or "go get a sandbag" while residents' homes were underwater in multiple suburbs on Saturday and Sunday, as the Lord Mayor Cr Adrian Schinnerer and the Premier were doing presented a publicly false picture of the severity of the flood.

The official information I was being given through the LDCC was at odds with my first hand observations on the ground. Oxley Creek flooded on 26 and 27 February. It is the Brisbane River's biggest tributary and localised flooding in ordinary storm events is common. The LDCC failed to publicly acknowledge or deal with the Oxley Creek Flood as well as significant overland and backflow flooding that occurred. Significant flood studies were done on Oxley Creek after the 2011 floods that seem to have been ignored and or not incorporated into Council's flood modelling matrix effectively.

On Saturday, 26 February the Lord Mayor contacted me and invited me to provide him with feedback about the floods. I took him at his word and did so because it is important (Att 3).

The Lord Mayor was personally advised at 3pm on Saturday 26 February that homes were flooding in Oxley. I asked for advice about Oxley Creek. The advice provided was wrong (its original source is unknown and I am not suggesting that the Lord Mayor made up this advice or provided deliberately incorrect advice), but it did not reflect the on the ground situation I was reporting nor did my advice appear to contribute to Council's understanding of the seriousness and severity of the flood in Tennyson Ward on Saturday and into the following Sunday. I again reiterate that my role in a flood is to provide advice to the LDCC and recognition that we have valuable local information and that is and was my primary task. I was marginalised, as I assume were other councillors, with critical local information as well.

The Lord Mayor has since publicly denied that neither he personally nor the LDCC knew that homes were being flooded on Saturday 26 February. He lied about his own actions and mine at the Council meeting of 15 March (Att 4). Those lies caused significant personal distress to me, indicated clearly that no one had properly considered the advice I was providing to the LDCC and its implications for low lying suburbs and significantly continued to my expulsion and removal from the Council meeting by the Queensland Police later in the Council meeting.

If they were errors of omission or mistakes they have not been corrected. This has severely shaken my confidence in Brisbane City Council and the Lord Mayor as a statutory office holder.

If an experienced Councillor of 14 years standing with practical flood experience and an official, all be it limited, role within the LDCC is ignored, what hope is there for timely and effective responses to a natural disaster? This contributes to my view that Council actively hindered the flood response.

Recommendation One – that the LDCC officially recognises and incorporates real time, local warnings from knowledgeable sources including the local councillor, about flood levels and locations into their flood assessment and decision making matrix. In addition to any review of the BOM forecasting and flood modelling matrix.

Recommendation Two – that a specific Oxley Creek flood warning protocol and response plan is developed, including installation of better real time telemetry data for Oxley Creek, flood modelling, clearer Oxley Creek flood level advice, specific evacuation plans and public messaging about flooding.

Recommendation Three – that flood gauges/signage are erected in flood prone areas to better warn the community about flood risk in critical flood prone areas. This is an undelivered recommendation from 2011.

Recommendation Four – that civic leaders including the Lord Mayor do not issue generic public statements about flooding that give false information to the public depending on their location. Crisis communication should be clear and should be specific about where flooding is happening eg low lying parts of Oxley or Fairfield are flooding evacuate now. It is possible to say in a public press conference, media statement, public service announcement or sit rep that Deagon residents should be sand bagging and Oxley residents should evacuate. That enables localised micro-messaging through multiple and diverse channels to reach the community as quickly as possible. Telling people to stay at home and get sandbags after they had flooded was perverse and is the most significant issue raised with me by the community.

In a crisis clear communication is needed.

I am not aware that any public emergency evacuation was broadcast through the media at all, either by the Premier or Lord Mayor. Council failed to send out the Sunday night sit rep to Councillors - that's after a flood warning/evacuation had been issued via the early (in this case late) warning system. Critical information was not passed on until the next day. Ensuring sit reps are provided in a timely way is important.

The early warning alert issued on Sunday night (Corinda 7.50pm, Sherwood 8.20pm) was a day and half too late for the suburbs of Oxley, Corinda, Fairfield, Sherwood, Graceville, Chelmer, Fairfield and Yeronga. How and why this happened should be fully investigated.

This system has been unreliable in the past and should be subjected to close examination. It is unclear to me whether that was a technology or human failure, or both.

Recommendation Five – that a thorough review of the Council Early Warning Alert system is undertaken including public consultation and a system upgrade or a new system adopted as soon as possible prior to summer 2023.

Much of the critical public awareness/community service information during and after the floods was treated as a Lord Mayoral “announceable” through the Lord Mayor’s social media channels. Many Councillors do not have access to the Lord Mayor’s social media accounts as he has blocked them, and funnelling critical disaster information through the Lord Mayor narrowed the availability of information available. There are plenty of people in Fairfield, Oxley and elsewhere who weren’t reading the Lord Mayor’s twitter account.

The role of the Crisis Communications Team and the Lord Mayor’s media office in hoarding critical public safety information and announcements should be carefully examined. I am not suggesting stopping Lord Mayoral responses, but the failure to make this information available to all Councillors in a timely and efficient way through the LDCC was wrong. The 2011 Flood Review recognised the valuable role that Local Councillors play as community leaders which is hampered when information is hoarded rather than being shared in a natural disaster. Having to search out information from other sources rather than through the central distribution hub of the LDCC is wrong. This problem is a major failing of Council’s disaster management organisational structure and the political control exercised by the Lord Mayor and senior cabinet Chairs over Council organisational resources.

This control has continued through the disaster recovery phase. For example, free tip access was recently stopped. This was published on the Lord Mayor’s Facebook page but not through LDCC sit reps. Processes for the Mud Army were not available until after the Lord Mayor announced it despite the public desperately seeking information about the clean-up. Ensuring there was a clear Mud Army process was a recommendation of the 2011 Flood Review but the information was politically managed by the Lord Mayor and Deputy Mayor rather than through the LDCC.

Recommendation Six – that the role of the Lord Mayor’s office and Corporate Crisis Communications Team is reviewed and transparent, accountable and timely procedures are put in place to ensure all critical public service information is made available to all Councillors through official channels ie the LDCC.

Recommendation seven – the role of Councillors as community leaders, advocates and communicators is acknowledged and officially recognised through official channels. This does not mean that Councillors should be running any natural disaster response. Rather, that Councillors are key community leaders who can effectively share information at a micro-level, mobilise and work with communities in disaster events.

The decision to establish a flood evacuation centre at Sleeman in Chandler was stupid. There’s no other way to say this. Setting up an evacuation centre remote from affected communities at a location they could not get to because roads were cut was stupid. The decision to set up the centre on Sunday morning, after it flooded was stupid. I apologise for my blunt language but the complete failure of the warning system was compounded by the complete failure of the evacuation centre process and its uselessness to dislocated Tennyson Ward residents.

In a torrential thunderstorm, having climbed over neighbours fences to escape flood waters with no car or being evacuated in a neighbours canoe, as happened to numerous residents in my ward, local evacuation points are needed. Police and emergency services need to be able

to quickly and efficiently move people to safety and then continue on with their activities. Driving from Oxley or Graceville to Chandler was not only impossible because of the number of cut roads, but in ordinary conditions it would have taken 40mins.

Establishing local evacuation centres, publicising evacuation routes and ensuring communities subject to isolation have clear evacuation plans were recommendations of the 2011 Flood Review. To my knowledge this has only occurred in one LNP ward Pullenvale. Not sure how many houses flooded there in 2022. It would be interesting to know.

Council has failed to implement the recommendations of the 2011 Flood Report because they are focused on a top down, centrally and politically controlled flood response. There is no attempt to work with local Councillors on flood training or scenario planning even when they ask. I have done so over many years. This is to the detriment of local communities and actively hindered the community response to the floods.

Recommendation Eight – annual disaster scenario events and training are run with the LDCC, Councillors and other relevant agencies ensuring that all councillors participate at least every second year. Being sent a general summer storms flyer IS NOT disaster training as the CEO Mr Colin Jensen suggests (Att 5 (a)(b)).

The establishment of temporary local evacuation centres or points is critical. In 2022, emergency temporary centres were opened spontaneously in Tennyson Ward at Graceville State School, Graceville Presbyterian Church and the Corinda Bowls Club. Riverlife Baptist Church at Seventeen Mile Rocks in Jamboree Ward was also opened.

While three temporary flood evacuation centre/points were recognised and established in LNP wards, Council specifically told Graceville State School not to offer emergency evacuation assistance. On Saturday and Sunday night lives were at risk because of Council's and other authorities' failure to warn and evacuate residents. Graceville State Schools offer was critical and not meant to cut across any official response, but to provide a temporary point of safety for local families. To my knowledge, Council had no authority to tell the school not to offer help. If Council had known about the Church and Bowls Club's actions, I am sure they would have been shut down too. Again, Council's actions actively hindered the flood response in Tennyson Ward.

In a crisis, people look to their nearest public building at a high safe point, and this is often a church or a school. Denying people a place of safety when a flood is happening, as Council officers did by saying "Council assets should be used" is not appropriate when there are none. Nor were any accessible nearby. Feedback from residents that evacuated in difficult circumstances was that the lack of a safe local place to go was distressing. People knocked on the doors of strangers to ask for help because they didn't know where to go. The lack of a local evacuation point/centre actively hindered the community flood evacuation.

The construction of a fence and locked pedestrian gate between the Rinora St, Corinda pedestrian easement and Corinda State High School created an even more complex access issue for Corinda residents in the Corinda Chase area. In 2011 there was no fence or locked gate and islanded Corinda Chase residents had immediate access via the School's grounds to Pratten St. In 2022, 250 residents were trapped with no way out of their neighbourhood and approx. 80 were badly flooded. No evacuation order was given to my knowledge. My concerns about this situation on Monday 28 February were ignored to my knowledge (Att 6). Residents remained isolated for five days with limited foot access only. Access was via a locked gate to the School which was only opened with local residents knowledge (including one of my staff). The School were quick to unlock and allow community access which was critical and I publically thank them for their assistance. However, as the School grounds were saturated even ad hoc foot access was difficult and carrying supplies in and out was difficult or

impossible for older residents. The only pedestrian footpath was bogged and unsafe. Requests to the LDCC to have the track made safe to ensure continued emergency access were not actioned.

The emergency gate between Finnegan Cct and Price Street Oxley, which would have provided critical emergency access for Oxley residents, was not opened despite my request to do so (Att 7). My general parks key did not work and all locks should be standard.

Recommendation Nine – local evacuation points are identified at key locations in flood prone districts, taking into account neighbourhoods subject to isolation or “islanding”, and are widely communicated through Council and community sources. A plaque should be prominently affixed to the door of a public building if it is determined to be a point of evacuation so it will be known to the community. Council offices and buildings, such as libraries in flooded areas should have plaques in prominent locations advising of the nearest local evacuation point/centre. Council should develop a plan to move people to larger evacuation hubs as soon as possible after an emergency evacuation to ensure they are suitably housed and supported. Council has a bus fleet that could perform this task.

Recommendation Ten – that the Sherwood Neighbourhood Centre is established as a flood recovery centre, similar to the Yeronga Community Centre, to provide a central point for the community in the event of a natural disaster. This would require State and Local Government cooperation, as well as the support of the Sherwood Neighbourhood Centre.

Recommendation Eleven – that Brisbane City Council and Corinda State High School establish a formal emergency easement from Rinora St to Pratten St, Corinda to provide emergency access (road and foot) for residents in the Corinda Chase area who were cut off and without power for five days. The decision to open the emergency access route should be made by Sherwood Police taking into account local flooding circumstances. Sherwood Police, the School, the local Councillor’s office should all have the keys to facilitate access in the event of a natural disaster.

Recommendation Twelve – in the event of an emergency Brisbane City Council unlocks emergency gates upon request to facilitate emergency access. Annual checks of gate locks should be undertaken to ensure that all locks are functional and standard and that the key emergency services such as the police, fire and SES and the local Councillor have a key.

Council has categorically failed to implement the 2011 Flood Review recommendations regarding evacuations.

Council also failed to work with a flood prone retirement village and nursing home - approx 450 elderly and vulnerable people were flood impacted at The Village Yeronga and Yeronga Regis, Cansdale St, Yeronga. Two stages of the retirement village had been built prior to the 2011 flood. Another four stages, including the nursing home, have been built since, all Code Assessable. No evacuation plans were required to be developed despite the known flooding risk. The Queensland Commission of Inquiry specifically identified the problems with the retirement development at Yeronga but Council continued to approve high risk vulnerable residential buildings in a flood prone area, with no safe, flood free road access. No conditions were ever made in any of the multiple development approvals by Council. No evacuation plans or liaison was ever undertaken with the nursing home or retirement village to my knowledge. This was a 2011 flood recommendation that has been ignored with disastrous consequences.

A month on The Village Residents are just returning home and Regis nursing home residents are not able to return until the end of May. They are being housed in alternate nursing homes remotely from their families causing much distress. It is unclear whether any lives were lost in the evacuation.

New planning standards (Council and State legislative change required) are needed to ensure that no nursing homes or retirement villages are built in flood prone areas including individual sites and/or on roads below flood level.

New planning standards (Council and State legislative change required) are needed to ensure that retirement villages and nursing home are retrospectively mandated to:

- relocate and raise all services above the City Plan flood line;
- install emergency power sources to facilitate the use of lighting and lifts for evacuation purposes (solar/generators to manage island impacts and evacuation responses);
- provide evacuation plans in tenancy/sale contracts to all residents;
- provide evacuation plans to Council, local Police and emergency services including management AND residents protocols for their activation;
- post evacuation plans in common areas on each floor.

How four additional stages of a retirement village and nursing home were approved by Council, given the disastrous 2011 flood impacts and lack of flood free road access to the site. The Queensland Commission of Inquiry investigation into the development in 2011 is astonishing and it is difficult to understand how additional stages of the development was allowed to proceed by Council.

Council has stamped specific recommendations about emergency evacuations for vulnerable communities as “completed” in the Flood Action Plan. The one and done approach that may not have even been done despite massive at risk development in Yeronga.

Recommendation Thirteen – develop new planning standards (Council and State legislative change required). These are needed to ensure that no nursing homes or retirement villages are built in flood prone areas.

Recommendation Fourteen – develop new planning standards (Council and State legislative change required). To ensure that retirement villages and nursing homes are retrospectively mandated to:

- relocate and raise all services above the City Plan flood line;
- install independent emergency power sources to facilitate the use of lighting and lifts for evacuation purposes (solar/generators to manage island impacts and evacuation responses);
- provide flood information and evacuation plans in tenancy/sale contracts to all residents;
- provide evacuation plans to Council, local Police and emergency services including management AND residents protocols for their activation;
- post evacuation plans in common areas on each floor; and
- undertake regular evacuation training.

Recommendation Fifteen – undertake an independent investigation into the governance, assessment process and decision making regarding all development approvals for The Village Yeronga and Regis Nursing Home, Cansdale St Yeronga to determine whether there is any malfeasance or corruption.

Volunteer Mud Army 2.0

The failure of the Council coordinated volunteer flood response known as the Mud Army 2.0 is one of the most perplexing outcomes of the flood response. The organic community response using Facebook community pages and community networks was swift and effective. The organic volunteer effort in neighbourhoods was magnificent. It preceded the official Mud Army response which was delayed by the Premier and Lord Mayor's weather concerns. However, help was still needed, particularly in suburbs where water was still receding later in the week.

According to the Lord Mayor, more than 16,700 people registered to help but only 1,700 were actually deployed on Saturday, 5 March. This defies belief and should be thoroughly investigated.

Limitations on the type of work volunteers could perform also meant many people did not receive the help they needed eg. Removal of wet plasterboard.

I fear the decision to ask people to register was a data gathering exercise by Brisbane City Council for marketing purposes.

On Tuesday, 2 March the Deputy Mayor Cr Krista Adams sent Councillors a spreadsheet asking us to provide detailed information house by house, street by street with specific advice about what type of help was needed (Att 8). There were approx 134 streets and approx. 3000 houses and businesses flood affected in my ward. On Tuesday 2 March flood waters were still inundating homes in Fairfield, Corinda, Sherwood and Oxley. Access by vehicle between the eastern and western sides of Tennyson Ward was only possible by via a circuitous 2hr trip through the inner northern suburbs. Many homes were not accessible until late Wednesday/early Thursday, 4 March.

Filling out Cr Adams spreadsheet was not humanly possible in my ward with geographically diverse flood impacts, inaccessible flooded neighbourhoods and the sheer volume of properties. Perhaps it was in wards with small numbers of flooded homes but not across approx. 3000 properties in nine suburbs. The 2022 flood was a mass incident. The number of affected homes in Tennyson Ward was similar to the entire disaster in Lismore estimated at between 2600 and 3000 properties (although not as severe).

What and how this spreadsheet was created and used should be thoroughly investigated. If it was part of the natural disaster plan, why had Councillors not been advised about or trained in the process? Matching residents and volunteers with help on a mass scale was never going to be possible if that was the intention. If it was the intention to provide targeted or matched assistance why has it not been done since? The Deputy Mayor's interference in the organised volunteer response should be investigated fully. What directions if any Cr Adams gave Council officers or the LDCC should be determined.

It was clear that the LDCC was deferring to the Deputy Mayor and telling Councillors that they could not register our requests. The LDCC, via the Councillor Liaison Officer, was the official link for Councillor to Council communications. I was told not to contact the LDCC but to deal with the Deputy Mayor, contrary to the established Council disaster plan (Att 9). Who made this decision?

By Wednesday 3 March Council had the following sources of flood information:

- satellite maps (Nearmap) of all flooded streets in Brisbane;
- on the ground intelligence from Council Officers and other emergency responders about where flooding occurred; and

- on the ground advice about flooding from Councillors via the LDCC.

Council knew where the flood occurred. They knew what advice would be given for volunteer roles and they determined when volunteers would be sent out. At the Council meeting of 15 March Civic Chairs, including the Deputy Mayor and Chair of City Standards, gave reports outlining all the information they had and when it was available (Att 10(a)(b)). Why then were they asking Councillors to provide detailed information about where it flooded and what help was needed? At some point it seems that a decision had been made to restrict the role and type of work that would be undertaken by the Mud Army 2.0. This was never clearly communicated with Councillors.

The political interference of the Deputy Mayor Cr Krista Adams and her insertion into the volunteer coordination role was unwarranted and unhelpful. It was outside the established Disaster Management Plan regarding Councillors roles. It actively hindered Council's flood recovery response and caused distress and confusion to me and my office as we feared our residents would not receive volunteer help. I still do not know whether the information I provided was used.

Recommendation Sixteen – an interactive online mapping tool is developed for registering requests for disaster assistance similar to the Move Safe pedestrian tool developed by Council in 2018. This can be publicly activated and shared to assist crowd sourcing requests for disaster assistance in future. It must be short and simple to use across a variety of platforms. A similar recommendation was made in 2011 and never implemented.

Recommendation Seventeen – protocols are established to ensure there are clear and direct lines of communication between Councillors and the LDCC that are not subjected to political interference. This was a recommendation of 2011 that needs review and refinement.

The limited nature of the deployment was also problematic. If you were not at home you were missed. There was no help the following day and very limited assistance since. Similarly, there was no help for businesses that were flooded other than the Brisbane Markets.

There were also odd reports from the deployment of volunteers. Buses in the wrong locations, tetanus shots before undertaking heavy lifting work, bus drivers returning to base before dropping off volunteers for work, whole streets being missed while adjoining streets were actioned. Tetanus shots were administered before undertaking physical work, rather than after. Some logistics issues are to be expected, but given the small scale of the deployment feedback should be sought from the volunteers about their experience and used to make it better next time.

Council has a data base of 16,700 plus people who offered to help but were never asked to help. Why not?

Recommendation Eighteen – Council develops a post emergency assistance programme using volunteer matching for a limited time after a natural disaster.

Waste

One of Council's core functions is waste collection. In the event of a major disaster a useful precedent was established regarding kerbside flood waste collection during the 2011 flood. Residents knew a flood kerbside collection would be undertaken at some point.

The failure of the waste response by Council in 2022 was and continues to be widespread. It seems there was no waste management disaster plan, when it started it was botched and there seems to be no consistency or clarity around the ongoing waste collection function. Again this is not a criticism of individual Council Staff and contractors. I know they gave it their all – I spoke with them every day on the ground in the ward. They were extraordinary but clearly were not being supported with clear management structures, advice, resources and logistics.

It is Council's failure to have a functioning and tested disaster waste management plan that was properly resourced and coordinated that must be explained. The dysfunction of the waste disaster response has actively hindered community recovery

Was there a waste plan? I made a Councillor file request on 15 March to review the plan. It has not been provided as at Friday, 8 April.

If there was a disaster waste plan, when was it last reviewed and tested in a disaster training scenario and updated?

The level of incompetence with the food waste bins in the first week of the floods cannot be understated. My office and I were repeatedly given incorrect information about waste management, which was passed onto residents causing anger, chaos and confusion. Council twice asked us to send the information they sent us, including the CEO which we did and still the food waste bins were not where they were supposed to be. For example, there is no Frederick St, Tennyson. That location was publicised by Council the whole time the bins were out to the public. My staff and I repeatedly tried to get the correct information, wasting enormous time and effort. The bins were then put out so late in such poor locations and remote from flooded neighbourhoods that they were not well utilised.

Problems include:

- food waste bins were not put out as advised, they were put out remote to flooded neighbourhoods, wrong street names/suburbs were published, then put out in the wrong locations repeatedly, then put out too late, then not put out in areas where they would have been timely, useful and requested;
- some streets had trucks and no workers and others workers and not enough trucks;
- contractors were onsite with crews but no information about where to go or who to talk to regarding their role eg Treescape re Hall St, Sherwood;
- there was a lack of machinery to handle the volume of waste;
- teams were randomly being pulled out of half-finished streets and sent elsewhere;
- driveways were being blocked;
- private property was used as dump site without permission in Sherwood – a formal complaint was made by the owner;
- responses about waste tasks such as verge clean up remain unanswered five weeks on despite official requests to the CEO;
- waste pick-ups are being logged with LDCC or Council and not being collected, despite repeated follow ups;
- ridiculous levels of information are being requested to even get a flood waste pick up;
- no timeframes or general advice around what to expect are being made to councillors;
- major sewerage spills occurred;
- Lord Mayoral announceables were being made and Councillors not advised eg free tip drop offs; and
- A resident in Chelmer was told to put their contaminated wheelie bin in the boot of her car and drive it to Rocklea or Moorooka to dump it.

The Army response in 2022 seemed very limited and largely absent in Tennyson Ward. This was very different to the 2011 flood where the army established multiple points for logistic support in Tennyson Ward at Chelmer, Graceville, Rocklea and Fairfield. A review of the Army's deployment would be useful to ensure it was directed to the area's most in need.

Recommendation Nineteen - that a natural disaster waste management plan is developed within six months and reviewed, updated and tested on an annual basis thereafter, and that Councillors are consulted and provide local intelligence about waste management issues within their wards to assist Council to prepare an effective and timely disaster waste plan and response. Feedback is sought from contractors and officers involved in the flood waste response to ensure a more effective natural disaster waste plan is developed.

Recommendation Twenty – that links between the Army and Council are reviewed and learnings incorporated into Council's disaster Waste management plan.

Councillors and communications

Councillors and their offices are valuable local resources and points of authority and information for their local communities. Council has marginalised the role of Councillors in a natural disaster.

The LDCC Councillor Liaison staff were polite and helpful but treated Councillor feedback and requests as clearing house rather than having any strategic value. The failure to undertake any training and specifically disaster scenario training at all with Councillors to refine and develop this relationship to ensure it is useful and practical has not been undertaken at all. (See Recommendation 8 and Att 5(a)(b)).

The lack of advice about Council responses to the flood of a public service kind (not individual replies) was a major failing of the flood response. Basic information was not available about waste management, clean-up operations or ongoing recovery. The only way to get this information is to make formal requests under the City of Brisbane Act provisions for Councillor information requests.

At times my staff and I found the phone at the LDCC would go unanswered. I am sure they were very busy and working their hardest but that speaks to understaffing. Additional resources are needed to support a more effective and integrated response to Councillor interaction with the LDCC. Sit Reps or a similar daily public service bulletin should be produced to ensure that critical information about emergency responses and flood recovery are made available to Councillors. Waiting on Lord Mayoral "announceables" and then trying to piece together information through the media or social media slowed down and actively hindered sharing information with the community.

The intervention of Councillors outside their wards and without any authority into other wards was inappropriate. My State Member advised me that an experienced and senior Councillor from a non-flooded Southside ward was hanging around the Army, where they were involved in food waste clean-up in Rocklea without reason or purpose. This Councillor later boasted in a Council meeting that she was going to "help" whether they wanted it or not. This kind of intervention, contrary to Council's disaster plan and without authority, is unhelpful. It is also not useful for external agencies.

I acknowledge and respect that under Council's disaster plans it is not our job to direct the disaster response locally, as much as I would have liked to do more.

Similarly, a neighbouring Councillor to Tennyson Ward offered to help me, and despite my concerns I did accept her offer and make a request. My request was for assistance in one of the most flood affected streets in the City and in a suburb we share. This request was ignored and the Councillor and her staff in their blue election campaign t-shirts drove around the 'bluest' parts of the ward handing out water. The email to me was not a genuine offer but cover to enable them to do what they wanted or were told to do. Her deceptive behaviour was distressing and unnecessary. What kind of person offers help then ignores a request?

Recommendation Twenty-one – that a protocol is developed to recognise the role of Councillors in a natural disaster and to strengthen the resources and integration of the Councillor Liaison Office within the LDCC and with Councillors.

See also Recommendation Eight.

In 2011 the Tennyson Ward office flooded catastrophically. Thanks only to the bravery of staff at the time, computers and paper work on our desks were carried out on the morning of the floods and loaded into a Council truck that had turned up to clean out the library. No arrangements were put in place to assist my office. We were out of the office for almost five months for half of this time with no working office at all until temporary space at Annerley was secured.

The Council 2011 Flood Review recommended that Tennyson Ward have access to a "functioning alternative temporary Ward office in the eventuality that the primary ward office is rendered unusable due to flooding" p 38.

While thankfully the ward office did not flood, water encroached up to the front door of the shopping centre in which the ward office is located, the shopping centre lost power and was shut for a week. I spoke with Tim Wright on Sunday to determine whether the Ward Office should be evacuated. At that time on Sunday afternoon he could not say. He advised the highest risk was Monday morning around 8am. I asked whether there would be any Council truck coming to clear out the library and my office but he said no. We were on our own. When Council couldn't confirm whether my office would flood on Sunday evening, one of my staff who could access the office attended the office on Monday morning and took computers out and raised as much as she could. She went above and beyond in the middle of a severe weather incident. This meant there was no functioning ward office for the second time in a major natural disaster. This is unacceptable.

As it did in 2011, the lack of a functioning office hampered our ability to respond to the natural disaster. The ward office phone had to be manually diverted to my phone and then staff phones, we had no photocopier or scanner and our remote computer access was not interactive with other Council systems so no printing could be undertaken other than putting a document on a USB stick and driving to an Officeworks (roads were cut) or another ward office (very busy) if we needed to print materials, which we did for residents. Internet was patchy generally in the immediate aftermath of the flood for several days. Staff had to use their own devices, at their own cost, to hotspot their personal computers in order to access Council's remote server. This was nearly impossible, as telecommunication networks were under severe strain. The ward office reopened on Friday 4 March when both the power and server were restored.

Whilst remote access to office systems established during COVID provided a higher degree of connectivity, all three of my ward office staff were flood affected:

- one had no power for five days
- one had no power for three days
- one was islanded for several days.

They could not or had very limited capacity to work from home, which is what the CEO told staff to do. We made our own plan.

Again Moorooka Ward Office assisted Tennyson Ward Office and we publicly thank them. When roads within the ward were accessible staff worked from my kitchen, as I was the only one with reliable power.

We managed because I knew what to do. However, it added a high degree of complexity, and stress to an already difficult situation.

A temporary flood free Tennyson Ward Office was a recommendation of 2011 that was never implemented. Following the floods in 2011 Brisbane City Council directed that my staff and I attend Green Square in Fortitude Valley if I wanted an alternate “flood free” office. There was no discussion or consultation with me. As I told them at the time that would not be possible.

Firstly, I would not be leaving the ward where I was needed on the ground to carry out my responsibilities as the Local Councillor and member of the community. The fact that Council wanted to dislocate me from my role in a natural disaster shows a lack of understanding and empathy for the localised nature of the work required with the community.

Secondly, we couldn't have got there if we tried as roads were cut everywhere and there was no public transport. Nor did we have any security access to the building. That was always a fundamental problem.

My strong objections to this directive were ignored by the CEO of Council. There was never any consultation or discussion with me to find a suitable working alternative post the 2011 floods. I doubt anybody at Council other than me knew that we were supposed to go to Green Square. No offer was made to assist us to establish a second office and I did not make one because it was never a sensible or practical option in the middle of a natural disaster. It would have been a waste of time.

Natural disasters, including severe floods, are increasing in severity and frequency due to climate change. A long term plan needs to be made to ensure that both myself and future Councillors have suitable facilities in a future flood or natural disaster to carry out the role.

I have previously asked for the Tennyson Ward office to be relocated. This permanent relocation would provide a flood free office and allow the library to expand its facilities as I have lobbied for many years.

Recommendation Twenty-two – that Council undertakes a search for a flood free and flood accessible Tennyson ward office in consultation with Councillor Johnston within 12 months. If Council is not agreeable to a permanent office relocation, that Council undertakes consultation to establish temporary (pop-up) suitable local flood free and flood accessible office facilities for Councillor Johnston and her staff within 12 months. Any location should be mutually agreeable to Council and the local Councillor.

The failure of Council to engage in any meaningful ongoing liaison with Councillors and their officers about flood recovery efforts is actively hindering community recovery.

Flood Mitigation

Recommendations from the 2011 Flood Review regarding flood mitigation measures were either not delivered or partially delivered then cancelled. Council has barely invested in flood mitigation around the city over the past seven years and very little in Tennyson Ward.

Residential flood buy back to assist with land use change was recommended by the 2011 Flood Review. It was only partially implemented.

Only 200 of 545 houses identified for buy back post the 2011 Flood were approached to be purchased. The flood buy back scheme was then unilaterally ceased by the Quirk/Schrinner Administration who control the majority in Council.

Some unusual decisions were made as part of the buy back programme and homes that flood regularly have been excluded for unknown reasons by Council while others nearby have been bought back. For example, in Sherwood a home higher than the two adjoining homes was bought back but not the two lower homes.

Repeated requests by my office for flood buy back were rebuffed.

Recommendation Twenty-three – the flood buy back scheme should be reintroduced and the eligibility trigger reassessed to ensure that houses that flooded in 1974, 2011 and 2022 are eligible for voluntary buy back.

Establishing a flood resilient homes programme has only been introduced in recent years and was available only in the suburbs of Paddington and Inala. I gather it has since been extended to Keperra. The decision to restrict the flood resilient homes programme to just three suburbs is political and inappropriate, and means that many residents have missed out on flood mitigation measures recommended for implementation eleven years ago as part of the 2011 Flood Review.

My repeated requests for flood resilient homes funding in Tennyson Ward have been rebuffed since the programme opened.

It is unreasonable and inequitable that a Council programme is not open fairly to all eligible properties, but rather on the basis of a political decision by suburb. This is wrong.

The programme should also be expanded to provide grants towards the cost of raising flood prone homes where appropriate. Council should also waive town planning application fees to encourage as many people as possible to raise their homes.

Recommendation Twenty-four - the flood resilient homes programme is immediately opened to all Brisbane suburbs and expanded to include grants for house raising. The Brisbane Housing Corporation could be tasked and funded to project manage this programme as part of their charter.

Over the past 10 years I have campaigned tirelessly for the recommended backflow valves for the 2011 Flood Review and the Subsequent AECOM Technical Report to be fully implemented.

Only 16 of the 51 locations recommended for backflow valves have been delivered by Council over the past 11 years. At some point they simply stopped doing them and Graham Quirk advised they would be considered in line with general drainage priorities only. This does include locations at Tennyson and Chelmer, but numerous others in Yeronga, Fairfield, Chelmer, Graceville and Tennyson HAVE NOT been delivered.

I have moved motions annually to fund and install the valves, made submissions as part of planning reviews including City Plan 2014, the PIP, and multiple LGIPS. Thousands of residents have campaigned via submissions and petitions to upgrade stormwater drainage and build backflow valves in my ward as recommended following the 2011 Floods. Council under the leadership of Graham Quirk and Adrian Schrinner, have refused on every single

occasion to support motions to deliver on the 2011 Flood recommendations, undertaken by experienced and qualified hydrologists and engineers, regarding backflow valves and backflow flooding as per Recommendation 10.14. As recently as the Council meeting of 15 March, the Deputy Mayor and Chair in charge of drainage, Councillor Davis, said they were not needed. This is despite the recommendations of the Council 2011 Flood Review and subsequent AECOM technical report into backflow valves.

Council has also grossly underfunded and underinvested in critical stormwater infrastructure in Tennyson Ward for decades. The Administration has delisted all Tennyson Ward backflow valves from inclusion in the LGIP and most stormwater over the two previous cycles in 2021 and 2018. This follows a stormwater drainage report in 2000 undertaken by Council recommending major upgrades to the stormwater drainage system in Yeronga. Council has never acted on these recommendations to my knowledge.

Failure to upgrade stormwater drainage pipes to increase their capacity and install the recommended backflow valves puts our community at risk.

Failure to invest in new bridge and culverts, for example in Corinda, to assist islanded communities achieve flood free road access.

Recommendation Twenty-five – that all backflow valves recommended by the AECOM Report following the 2011 Council Flood Review are implemented within three years and published to ensure transparency and accountability regarding the delivery of flood mitigation infrastructure (Att 11). Valves that protect houses are to be prioritised. That a further technical assessment and report is undertaken to identify new locations for backflow valves and other flood mitigation measures such as localised levees (if appropriate), bridges, culverts or other infrastructure are undertaken over the next twelve months to enhance the flood immunity of neighbourhoods and specific locations within Brisbane.

Recommendation Twenty-six – that all stormwater drainage projects in Tennyson Ward cut from the PIP and LGIP are reinstated as a matter of urgency and delivered within five years.

Council must take more steps to protect houses and subdivisions it has approved that are regularly inundated by backflow flooding, creek flooding and river flooding.

Council seems to have millions to spend on promoting the Olympics but not enough for flood mitigation infrastructure works in known flood risk areas. Further ongoing investment into flood mitigation infrastructure including:

- stormwater drainage upgrades;
- backflow valves;
- culverts and bridges;
- localised levees; and
- emergency road and pedestrian access.

Some parts of this City should not be built upon. Both the State and Council are allowing medium to high density building in known high flood risk areas, for example, Yeronga and Yeerongpilly. The area is filled reducing flood plain storage and worsening the flood for others and sometimes the property may not flood in a habitable area, the basement floods, services are flooded, roads are cut and properties islanded, there is no power for a week and residents are displaced.

Given the impacts of climate change these events will only worsen in both frequency and severity in coming years, placing an even greater burden on government and community

resources to manage and recover from natural disasters. Changes need to be made now to the planning scheme (Council and State legislation) within existing flood prone communities.

Recommendation Twenty-seven – that the Queensland Development Code and Council Flood and related Codes are reviewed to:


- **prevent material change of use or sub-division in flood prone areas unless there is flood free emergency road access to the site and the site is not for any habitable purpose, community use or invasive/general industry use;**
- **develop mandatory emergency evacuation procedures;**
- **implement new building standards to ensure that flood prone buildings are safe and self-sufficient in the event of islanding; and**
- **undertake long-term land use change via buy back and rezoning to remove general industry and hazardous industry from the Oxley Creek Flood Plan.**

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide a submission to the 2022 Flood Review. I hope that my feedback and recommendations are useful. My observations are based upon my local knowledge as the local Councillor for Tennyson Ward and interactions with the LDCC and the community during the recent natural disaster. This time Council must act to deliver on and integrate better natural disaster planning and training into Council's organisational structure. They did not do so after 2011 instead patting themselves on the back, stamping the 2011 Flood Review "Complete" and moving on without ongoing review. The Yeronga Community Centre have prepared a submission for your consideration and it is attached at Appendix 3. They are an experienced and knowledgeable flood hub that has been a valuable asset over the last five weeks to our local community.

I can be reached on telephone 3403 8605 or
information or clarification of any of the points noted above.

should you require further

Yours sincerely



**Nicole Johnston LLB, BA Hons, MPP
Councillor Tennyson Ward**

Appendix One - Recommendations

Appendix Two - Attachments

Appendix Three – Yeronga Community Centre Submission

Appendix One – Recommendations

Recommendation One – that the LDCC officially recognises and incorporates real time, local warnings from knowledgeable sources including the local councillor, about flood levels and locations into their flood assessment and decision making matrix. In addition to any review of the BOM forecasting and flood modelling matrix.

Recommendation Two – that a specific Oxley Creek flood warning protocol and response plan is developed, including installation of better real time telemetry data for Oxley Creek, flood modelling, clearer Oxley Creek flood level advice, specific evacuation plans and public messaging about flooding.

Recommendation Three – that flood gauges/signage are erected in flood prone areas to better warn the community about flood risk in critical flood prone areas.

Recommendation Four – that civic leaders including the Lord Mayor do not issue generic public statements about flooding that give false information to the public depending on their location. Crisis communication should be clear and should be specific about where flooding is happening eg low lying parts of Oxley or Fairfield are flooding evacuate now.

Recommendation Five – that a thorough review of the Council Early Warning Alert system is undertaken including public consultation and a system upgrade or a new system adopted as soon as possible prior to summer 2023.

Recommendation Six – that the role of the Lord Mayor’s office and Corporate Crisis Communications Team is reviewed and transparent, accountable and timely procedures are put in place to ensure all critical public service information is made available to all Councillors through official channels ie the LDCC.

Recommendation seven – the role of Councillors as community leaders, advocates and communicators is acknowledged and officially recognised through official channels.

Recommendation Eight – annual disaster scenario events and training are run with the LDCC, Councillors and other relevant agencies ensuring that all councillors participate at least every second year.

Recommendation Nine – local evacuation points are identified at key locations in flood prone districts, taking into account neighbourhoods subject to isolation or “islanding”, and are widely communicated through Council and community sources. A plaque should be prominently affixed to the door of a public building if it is determined to be a point of evacuation so it will be known to the community. Council offices and buildings, such as libraries in flooded areas should have plaques in prominent locations advising of the nearest local evacuation point/centre. Council should develop a plan to move people to larger evacuation hubs as soon as possible after an emergency evacuation to ensure they are suitably housed and supported. Council has a bus fleet that could perform this task.

Recommendation Ten – that the Sherwood Neighbourhood Centre is established as a flood recovery centre, similar to the Yeronga Community Centre, to provide a central point for the community in the event of a natural disaster.

Recommendation Eleven – that Brisbane City Council and Corinda State High School establish a formal emergency easement from Rinora St to Pratten St, Corinda to provide emergency access (road and foot) for residents in the Corinda Chase area who were cut off and without power for five days. The decision to open the emergency access route should be made by Sherwood Police taking into account local flooding circumstances. Sherwood Police,

the School, the local Councillor's office should all have the keys to facilitate access in the event of a natural disaster.

Recommendation Twelve – in the event of an emergency Brisbane City Council unlocks emergency gates upon request to facilitate emergency access. Annual checks of gate locks should be undertaken to ensure that all locks are functional and standard and that the key emergency services such as the police, fire and SES and the local Councillor have a key.

Recommendation Thirteen – develop new planning standards (Council and State legislative change required). These are needed to ensure that no nursing homes or retirement villages are built in flood prone areas.

Recommendation Fourteen – develop new planning standards (Council and State legislative change required). These are needed to ensure that retirement villages and nursing home are retrospectively mandated to:

- relocate and raise all services above the City Plan flood line;
- install independent emergency power sources to facilitate the use of lighting and lifts for evacuation purposes (solar/generators to manage island impacts and evacuation responses);
- provide flood information and evacuation plans in tenancy/sale contracts to all residents;
- provide evacuation plans to Council, local Police and emergency services including management AND residents protocols for their activation;
- post evacuation plans in common areas and on each floor; and
- undertake regular evacuation training.

Recommendation Fifteen – undertake an independent investigation into the governance, assessment process and decision making regarding all development approvals for The Village Yeronga and Regis Nursing Home, Cansdale St Yeronga to determine whether there is any malfeasance or corruption.

Recommendation Sixteen – an interactive online mapping tool is developed for registering requests for disaster assistance similar to the Move Safe pedestrian tool developed by Council in 2018. This can be publicly activated and shared to assist crowd sourcing requests for disaster assistance in future. It must be short and simple to use across a variety of platforms.

Recommendation Seventeen – protocols are established to ensure there are clear and direct lines of communication between Councillors and the LDCC that are not subjected to political interference.

Recommendation Eighteen - Council develops a post emergency assistance programme using volunteer matching for a limited time after a natural disaster.

Recommendation Nineteen - that a natural disaster waste management plan is developed within six months and reviewed, updated and tested on an annual basis thereafter, and that Councillors are consulted and provide local intelligence about waste management issues within their wards to assist Council to prepare an effective and timely disaster waste plan and response. Feedback is sought from contractors and officers involved in the flood waste response to ensure a more effective natural disaster waste plan is developed.

Recommendation Twenty – that links between the Army and Council are reviewed and learnings incorporated into Council's disaster Waste management plan.

Recommendation Twenty-one – that a protocol is developed to recognise the role of Councillors in a natural disaster and to strengthen the resources and integration of the Councillor Liaison Office within the LDCC with Councillors.

Recommendation Twenty-two – that Council undertakes a search for a flood free and flood accessible Tennyson ward office in consultation with Councillor Johnston within 12 months. If Council is not agreeable to a permanent office relocation, that Council undertakes consultation with Tennyson ward office to establish temporary (pop-up) suitable local flood free and flood accessible office facilities for Councillor Johnston and her staff within 12 months. Any location should be mutually agreeable to Council and the local Councillor.

Recommendation Twenty-three – the flood buy back scheme should be reintroduced and the eligibility trigger reassessed to ensure that houses that flooded in 1974, 2011 and 2022 are eligible for voluntary buy back.

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Recommendation Twenty-five – that all backflow valves recommended by the AECOM Report following the 2011 Council Flood Review are implemented within three years and published to ensure transparency and accountability regarding the delivery of flood mitigation infrastructure (Att 12). Valves that protect houses are to be prioritised. That a further technical assessment and report is undertaken to identify new locations for backflow valves and other flood mitigation measures such as localised levees (if appropriate), bridges, culverts or other infrastructure are undertaken over the next twelve months to enhance the flood immunity of neighbourhoods and specific locations within Brisbane.

Recommendation Twenty-six – that all stormwater drainage projects in Tennyson Ward cut from the PIP and LGIP are reinstated as a matter of urgency and delivered within five years.

Recommendation Twenty-seven – that the Queensland Development Code and Council Flood and related Codes are reviewed to:

- prevent material change of use or sub-division in flood prone areas unless there is flood free emergency road access to the site and the site is not for any habitable purpose, community use or invasive/general industry use;
- develop mandatory emergency evacuation procedures;
- implement new building standards to ensure that flood prone buildings are safe and self-sufficient in the event of islanding; and
- undertake long-term land use change via buy back and rezoning to remove general industry and hazardous industry from the Oxley Creek Flood Plan.

Appendix Two – Attachments

(Please note the attachments contain personal information including names, phone numbers and emails for Council Officers and Flooded Residents. The attachments should not be published without redaction where appropriate)

Att 1 – Tennyson Ward flood map

Att.2 – emails to the LDCC 26 and 27 February 2022

Att 3 – Lord Mayor & Cr Johnston emails/replies

Att 4 - extract from Council minutes 15 March 2022

Att 5 (a) - email to CEO re disaster planning

Att 5 (b) - letter from CEO re disaster planning

Att 6 - email to LDCC re Corinda isolation

Att 7 - email to LDCC re Oxley emergency access gate

Att 8 - email and spreadsheet from Deputy Mayor re Mud Army

Att 9 – email from LDCC with advice to contact Cr Adams re Mud Army assistance

Att 10 (a) – Economic Development and The Brisbane 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Committee Report 8 March 2022

Att 10 (b) – City Standards Committee Report 15 March 2022

Att 11 - AECOM back flow valve locations

Appendix Three – Yeronga Community Centre submission

2022BCCFloodReview submission_CommunityPlus+.pdf

Att. 1



Moorooka

Chelmer	- 15 Streets
Grville	- 15
Sheward	- 17
Corinda	- 13
Oxley	- 22
Tennyson	- 4
Fairfield	- 22
Tewaga	- 22
Tipahy	- 5
total	approx 130

Coopers Plains